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Insurgency emerges frommany interactions between numerous social, economical, and geographical factors.
Adequately accounting for the large number of potentially relevant interactions, and the complex ways in which they
operate, is key to creating valuable models of insurgency. However, this has long been a challenging endeavour, as
insurgency imposes specific limitations on the data that could speak to these interactions: quantitative data is limited
by the difficulties of systematic collection in war, while qualitative data may include vague or conflicting insights from
direct observers. In this paper, we designed a computational framework based on Fuzzy Cognitive Maps and Complex
Networks to face these limitations. A software solution fully implements this framework and allows analysts to
conduct simulations, in order to better understand the current dynamics of insurgency or test ‘what-if’ scenarios. Two
approaches are presented to guide analysts in developing models based on our framework, either through a nuanced
reading of the literature, or by aggregating the knowledge of domain experts.
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Introduction
Initially of interest primarily to soldier-scholars seeking
to systematise their experiences as counter-insurgents in
wars of decolonisation [1,2], insurgency (and its cognates)
increasingly became the subject of several landmark
studies by political scientists [3-5], historians [6], and
economists [7]. Together with this considerable renais-
sance in the study of insurgency, computational research
into the dynamics of terrorism and rebellion has grown
in prominence [8]. One of the drivers of this growth is
the ability of computational approaches to account for
the many complex interactions between the factors that
shape a conflict, which makes such approaches a valuable
complement to the associational analyses stemming from
economics and seeking to identify ‘root causes’. Compu-
tational models have indeed been able to systematise and
articulate many of the key processes which define insur-
gency as a particular type of conflict. For example, a recent
model used 19 factors and over 80 parameters, account-
ing for processes such as the consequences of intelligence
gathering on the insurgent’s organization or the impact of
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outside support on the insurgents’ actions [9]. The task
of populating the model’s parameters with real-world data
is often left to the analysts [9] but this task can be par-
ticularly challenging as models require specific numerical
values despite sources mostly providing qualitative data
from empirical evidence. While the challenge of creating
quantitative models of insurgency when given qualitative
data has already been thoroughly addressed in the political
methodology from a statistical perspective [10], this chal-
lenge remains relatively unexplored from a computational
perspective.
In this paper, we develop a novel computational method
that can be used to model how an array of interacting
factors come together to determine loyalty or rebellious-
ness. This method involves two computational techniques
whose synergies are essential to address the specific needs
ofmodelling in insurgency. The artificial intelligence tech-
nique of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) has a proven
track record in allowing for the development of models
when supporting data is vague or conflicting. Using this
technique will allow us to address one of the main short-
comings of current models as aforementioned. While
FCMs have been used to model complex political phe-
nomena, such as crises in the Republic of Macedonia
[11] or Cyprus [12], this technique is not designed to
© 2014 Giabbanelli; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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capture the spatial dynamics that play a very important
role in conflicts (c.f., [13] for the role that urban geography
plays in terrorism). For example, not adequately capturing
the diffusion of civil wars over space [14] or the local-
ized nature of attacks [15] would significantly lower the
relevance of models to analysts. We previously demon-
strated that FCMs could be used tomodel social processes
but that they would have to be combined with another
technique for local dynamics [16]. Our early work com-
bined FCMs with Cellular Automaton [17], which have
a long history of being used to model spatial dynamics
[18] but suffer from having to rigidly divide the space into
equal square cells. Therefore, we propose to represent the
space as a Complex Network (CN), which offers several
advantages over the early version of this framework: the
space can be arbitrarily divided, standard generators can
be used to test how a strategy would unfold in differ-
ent types of space, and the analyses tools developed for
complex networks can be used to explore the relationship
between the structure of that space and the dynamics of
insurgency.
Contribution of the paper
The principal contributions of the present work can be
summarized as follows:
• We propose a computational framework to support
researchers in mathematically expressing the
important but often hard-to-formalise relationships
spanning social and physical geography.
• We present a novel software solution that guides
modellers and analysts in designing a model of
insurgency in an interactive manner and then
simulate it.
• We show two different approaches for the practical
development of a model of insurgency based on our
framework. One approach relies on a nuanced
reading of a large corpus by a domain expert, while
the other focuses on synthesizing the knowledge of
an international group of experts.
Organization of the paper
We start by providing the technical background to our
computational framework, and we formally specify it.
Then, we detail the first and key step in building a model
based on this framework: how to design a conceptual
map articulating the interactions between several fac-
tors contributing to insurgency. We further highlight the
functioning of the framework through our software imple-
mentation, with a focus on how it enables experts to
interactively and efficiently set up computer models of
insurgency tailored for the context they are interested in.




Insurgents can be mobile and difficult to identify, which
limits the potential of terrain-centric and enemy-centric
approaches for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In
contrast, the population is easy to identify and often
less mobile. Unlike conventional warfare, opposing forces
in counterinsurgency warfare thus do not only seek to
reduce each other’s military capability but are also com-
peting for the support of the population [1]. In soci-
eties with tribal power structures such as Iraq, winning
the ‘hearts and minds’ of local opinion leaders is criti-
cal to secure support. Once opinion leaders are clearly
identified (e.g., using the Tactical Conflict Assessment
Framework in Iraq) the question becomes: who among
them should be targeted [19]? This question can also
be approached from a geographical standpoint. Leaders
must not only be persuaded that their interests are in
line with counterinsurgents, but also that their interests
will be protected. Given that forces cannot be deployed
everywhere, the question becomes: where can protection
be guaranteed in return for political support? Whether
it is approached from a social-network perspective (who)
or a geographical-network perspective (where), this is
often studied as a variation of an influence maximization
problem. The influence maximization problem posed by
Domingos and Richardson [20] and modelled by Kempe
and colleagues [21] asks, for a parameter k, to find the
set of k nodes that provide the maximum influence. This
needs to be extended in the case of insurgencies, since
both insurgents and counterinsurgents want to spread
their influence while blocking that of their opponent.
This leads to an influence blocking maximization problem,
which is different from the competitive influence maxi-
mization problem where forces are solely interested in
maximimizing their influence instead of limiting others’.
In the context of insurgency, these problems have often
been modelled using complex networks (which account
for the great variation in ties between people or places)
and agent-based systems (which highlight the reasoning
behind a switch in allegiance).
In [19,22], each node of the network represents a person.
The attitude of a person with respect to the compet-
ing forces is represented by a value ranging from -0.5
(favourable to Taliban) to +0.5 (favourable to the US).
Individuals are also categorized by their level of influence,
which includes head of household or village leader. Indi-
viduals change attitude solely based on pairwise interac-
tions between them. The outcome of interactions depend
on set probabilities, and can lead to both individuals
changing to their average attitude, retaining the original
attitudes, or having one change to become more like the
other based on a parameter. The model in [23] also prop-
agates opinions through social links using probabilistic
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rules. One noteworthy simplification in these models was
the absence of the context, that is, the set of politi-
cal, economical, and social aspects that shape leaders’
attitudes. For example, a village leader’s loyalty to the
government may wither as a larger number of young
men in the village become unemployed. These aspects
also mitigate the influence exerted during COIN opera-
tions or by the insurgent. While tribal relationships have
been taken into account in some models [24], aspects
such as the trustworthiness of institutions or the dis-
crimination of counter-insurgent violence would impact
the outcome of interactions with forces supportive of the
government.
Taking into account the broader context in which indi-
viduals make decisions can be very challenging due to the
complexity of this context and the difficulty of collecting
data about it. Focusing on the counterinsurgency envi-
ronment, Upshur and colleagues wrote that “researchers
are not impartial but rather armed actors in a conflict;
thus there is a ‘combatant observer effect’. The inter-
viewer’s obvious association with a combatant organiza-
tion affects the openness and honesty of respondents, as
does the power disparity between amember of an occupy-
ing military force and an unarmed local population” [25].
Consequently, data corruption results in uncertainty and
bias. Furthermore, disagreements on the mechanisms are
not only found between the reports of direct observers
but also in the analyses of scholars. For example, Fearon
and Laitin reported that “the effect of primary commod-
ity exports is considerable: [...] a country with no natural
resource export only has a probability of warstart of 1%”
compared to 22% when exporting” [7], but Ross consid-
ered that “the claim that primary commodity exports are
linked to civil war appears fragile and should be treated
with caution” [26]. Therefore, there is a need for compu-
tational models that can use the qualitative data provided
by process-tracking and ethnographical studies, and have
specific mathematical ways to address the uncertainty and
conflicts found in the data.
Many frameworks have been proposed to model dif-
fusion in networks [27], and they account for uncer-
tainty in different ways. In the Weighted Generalized
Annotated Program (wGAP) framework, changes are
expressed by rules whose probability reflects the cer-
tainty [28]. For example, the rule supportInsurgents(A) 0.75←
supportInsurgents(B) ∧ leader(B,A) states that if the
village leader B for inhabitant A supports insurgents, then
A will support the insurgents with 75% certainty. Simi-
larly, the Linear Threshold Model (LTM) and the Inde-
pendent Cascade Model (ICM) have rules for changes
in the nodes’ attitudes, and random thresholds are asso-
ciated with these rules to model uncertainty [21]. The
Multi-Attribute Networks and Cascades (MANCaLog)
framework provides more flexibility, the properties of
nodes and edges have a weight whose uncertainty is rep-
resented by an interval that can be open or closed [27].
However, a key distinction is that these frameworks are
designed to operate once the values for the uncertainty
have been specified: they are not made to take in (possibly
contradictory) qualitative assessments and turn them into
values based on the uncertainty.
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
Fuzzy Logic Theory is a valuable mathematical technique
to deal with the conflicting and uncertain evidence found
in the wealth of testimonies, media reports, and other
forms of ‘thick description’. As described by Li, Fuzzy
Logic Theory [29]
resembles human reasoning under approximate
information and inaccurate data to generate decisions
under uncertain environments. It is designed to
mathematically represent uncertainty and vagueness,
and to provide formalized tools for dealing with
imprecision in real-world problems.
When trying to evaluate the strength (and thus the
existence of) a mechanism, straightforwardly assigning a
score to each source and simply computing the average or
the mode would address neither vagueness nor conflicts.
Instead, Fuzzy Logic Theory allows us to summarize
opinions via linguistic terms (e.g., a mechanism may have
a “weak” or “medium” effect) and consider that each term
is associated to a range of values. A membership function
represents the range of each term, and ranges can overlap
to account for the possibility that an expert judges a rela-
tionship to be “strong” while actually thinking the same
as the expert who calls the relationship “very strong”.
The choice of a membership function depends on the
problem. Triangular membership functions (Figure 1)
are often used [30,31], and a plethora of alternatives
exists (e.g., Z-shape, Gaussian, and S-shaped membership
functions [32]).
Once the evidence is summarized via a linguistic term, a
set of IF-THEN rules is produced. For example, we asked
experts to evaluate the extent to which an inhospitable
terrain would contribute to the government’s institutional
weakness. Two experts judged the effect to be ‘medium’
while two saw it as ‘high’ and one called it ‘very high’. The
IF-THEN rules associate a crisp antecedent (e.g., whether
the terrain is inhospitable) to a fuzzy consequent (e.g.,
a ‘medium’ or ‘high’ impact on the government’s insti-
tutional weakness) and a confidence factor (e.g., number
of experts who produced that rule). In this example, we
obtain:
R1: IF (Inhospitable terrain is PRESENT) THEN the impact on the
(Government’s institutional weakness) ismedium (2/5)
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Figure 1 Triangular membership functions. Perceptions for concepts of strength correspond to membership functions, which can overlap. This
particular shape is known as a triangular membership function.
R2: IF (Inhospitable terrain is PRESENT) THEN the impact on the (Govern-
ment’s institutional weakness) is high (2/5)
R3: IF (Inhospitable terrain is PRESENT) THEN the impact on the (Gov-
ernment’s institutional weakness) is very high (1/5)
These rules are combined to formulate a Fuzzy Infer-
ence Systems that yields one quantitative value. Fuzzy Set
Theory is repeatedly applied to obtain one crisp value
from the evidence supporting each relationship in the
model. These relationships are connected: for example,
an inhospitable terrain can impact the ability of insur-
gents to control the population which in turns affects
the socio-economic advantage to insurgency. Therefore,
these connections can be viewed as a network named a
Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM). The nodes of the network
represent fuzzy domain concepts (e.g., trustworthiness of
institutions, baseline tension). The edges stand for causal
connections, and their values are obtained via Fuzzy Set
Theory. Edges are either positive or negative to indicate
that the target concept respectively increases or decreases
with the source concept. Since the introduction of FCMby
Kosko in 1986 [33] and its initial application as an artifi-
cial intelligence tool to public policy [34], FCMs have been
used successfully in critical situations where accuracy has
to be obtained despite vagueness [35], such as evaluating
the vulnerability of facilities to terrorism [36].
Formally, the number of concepts in the FCM is denoted
by n and the matrix Si,j, i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . . n denotes
the strength of the relationships from concepts i to con-
cept j. The vector Ci(t) stores the values of all concepts
at time t. For example, if inhospitable terrain is the third
concept and the government’s institutional weakness is the
fifth one, then S3,5 represents the link from the latter to
the former, and their initial values are stored in C3(0) and
C5(0) respectively. The simulation of the FCM consists of
updating the values stored in V until a subset of them sta-
bilizes (c.f., algorithm in [30]). For example, if the analyst
is interested in knowing how the rise in unemployment
and household poverty will ultimately impact the socio-
economic advantage to insurgency, then the FCM will be
updated until the socio-economic stops fluctuating. The
following equation is used to perform one update:








where f is a threshold function (also known as transfer
function) that bounds the output in the interval [0, 1]. It
is common practice to use such function in order to keep
concepts within a specific range [37]. This function can
be, for instance, a sigmoid function such as the hyperbolic
tangent f (x) = tanhx = ex−e−xex+e−x [31].
Complex networks
In our framework, the geographical space over which an
insurgency takes place needs to be discretized. A straight-
forward approach would be to map the space to a grid,
that is, to partition it into squares [17]. However, this
approach raises several issues. If the squares are too large,
then important local differences are ignored; for example,
two districts may end up merged under one cell despite
tremendous discrepancies in terms of socio-economic sta-
tus and, ultimately, propensity to support an insurgency.
Squares could be made smaller to ensure that different
contexts are represented by different cells, but the larger
number of squares would negatively impact the perfor-
mances of a simulation, and redundancy could occur
frequently as taking too small a resolution can lead to sub-
dividing a space that has a homogeneous context. Thus,
the difficulty is to avoid redundancy in order to keep
performances satisfactory, while adequately representing
local differences. Using networks provides the flexibility
required for this situation. In a network approach, each
region deemed homogeneous with respect to factors of
interest to the analyst (e.g., unemployment, use of explo-
sive device, dailymurder rate) is represented as one vertex,
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and this vertex is connected to all adjacent regions by an
edge (Figure 2). Networks have long been used to under-
stand the properties of various phenomena in space. A
recent review of research results on this approach is pro-
vided in [38], while several complete study cases can be
found in [39]. Formally, locations are expressed by the set
of vertices V while adjacency is given by the edges E.
As our framework aims to support analysts, the space
must be represented in a way that is not only efficient
for calculations: analysts should also be able to navigate
this space in an intuitive way. The primary reason to use
cellular automata in our previous work was that their
straightforward mapping of space onto a grid could eas-
ily be navigated [17]. However, this came at the expense
of the aforementioned issues in efficiency. Using networks
addresses the issue of efficiency, but questions are then
raised regarding the ease of use by analysts.While navigat-
ing a general network can be a challenge, this task is simple
in our case since a geographical division of space into
neighbourhoods or regions produces planar networks.
Indeed, the sub-spaces represented as vertices are linked
by edges only when they are adjacent, and thus edges
do not need to cross in order to display the network. A
wealth of research has been conducted to display planar
graphs, initially motivated by the need to display electrical
schemes of large circuits for engineering purposes. There-
fore, a number of algorithms such as surveyed in [41] offer
convenient displays that can support analysts in exploring
the geographical dynamics of insurgency. Furthermore,
additional support is provided through ongoing research
in natural interaction techniques for networks (c.f., the
work of Nathalie Henry Riche).
Coupling
Each location contains an FCM that expresses the social
dynamics within that location. The FCMs all have the
same structure, as the concepts and mechanisms con-
tributing to insurgency are selected for the entire event
(e.g., war in Baghdad, insurgency in Syria) rather than for
a specific neighbourhood. However, the values of these
concepts depend on the location. For example, we might
consider that a lack of political representation contributes
to both the weakness of a government and the exclu-
sion of an ethnic group, which in turn favour insurgency.
However, the level of political representation might dif-
fer across neighbourhood; in the case of Iraq and Baghdad
(Figure 2), the Sunni neighbourhoods of Azamiyah and
Doura would have a different level of political repre-
sentation compared to the Shia neighbourhoods of New
Baghdad and Kazimiyah. Some of the concepts are influ-
enced by the values of concepts in surrounding locations,
as defined by the network in the previous section. Figure 3
illustrates this influence: all locations (circles) have the
same concepts linked in the same way, but one con-
cept is influenced by neighbours. Focusing on the dotted
orange circle, the ability of insurgents to control popu-
lation movements at that location is influenced by the
control that is exerted in the surrounding four locations.
Network influences are applied first, and then the FCMs
are updated to reflect how such influences would turn out
based on the local context. It is possible for such influ-
ences to be cancelled out because of opposing forces (e.g.,
inhabitants in the target neighbourhood are politically
well-represented and have a high level of trust in insti-
tutions), or they could be reinforced due to the presence
of factors fuelling insurgency (e.g., household poverty and
number of unemployed young men). This coupling allows
to accurately represent local dynamics through FCMs, and
asssess the spread of influences over larger areas using a
network.
Formally, we extend the notation of FCMs to express the
value of a concept i at time t in a location v ∈ V by Ci,t,v.
The extent to which a concept a of the FCM is influenced
by a (not necessarily distinct) concept b is given by Wa,b.
The influence function f takes in two concepts, where the
first is under the influence of the second, and computes
Figure 2 Geography of Baghdad.Map of Baghdad used in Operation Together Forward [40] (a) and its abstraction using a network (b).
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Figure 3 Impact of neighbouring influences mediated by local context. All locations (circles) have the same concepts and mechanisms (large
black arrows), but neighbouring influences (blue arrows) will impact some concepts (thin black arrows). In this situation, the hostility of the terrain
follows a North-South gradient, while the insurgency has a stronghold in the North-East.
the the impact of the influence. One time step of the sim-
ulation is given in Algorithm 1. The Algorithm has two
parts. First, it applies the influence of neighbouring loca-
tions: for each location i ∈ V and each neighbour j ∈ V,
all concepts of i will be influenced by the concepts of j.
While we previously used dedicated functions to spec-
ify which concepts were either influenced or influencing
[16], this new formalism simply encodes such roles inWa,b
since Wa,b > 0 states that b is an influencing concept and
a the concept under influence. The second part uses the
local context to mediate the influences that were received,
by independently updating each FCM using the standard
procedure in the literature [30].
Creating conceptual maps
The first step in designing models based on our frame-
work is to create a conceptual map that uses expert knowl-
edge to assess which factors are relevant to insurgency
in a specific context and how these factors can be artic-
ulated. The product of this step is a network consisting
of representative factors (i.e., vertices) whose interactions
(i.e., edges) are either positive (i.e., the presence of a fac-
tor increases another) or negative and are given a strength.
Two broad approaches support the elicitation of knowl-
edge from an expert in order to construct maps [42]:
direct approaches assist the experts in constructing maps
Algorithm 1 Updates the simulation for one time step
Require: The FCMs at each location have initial values,
time t > 0
1: //Applies the geographical dynamics in parallel
2: for i ∈ V do
3: for j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E do
4: //for each location j influencing a location i
5: for a = 1 . . .n do
6: for b = 1 . . .n do
7: //for each combination of concepts in the
FCMs
8: Ca,t+1,i ← Ca,t,i + Wa,b × f (Ca,t,i,Cb,t,i)
//updates the value of concept a
9: //Standard procedure to update each FCM until sta-
bilization [30]
10: for i ∈ V do
11: update(i)
(e.g., Novak’s concept mapping [43]) for example by asking
them which concepts are important and how they are
related, while indirect approaches infer the maps from
written documents or interviews (e.g,, Trochim’s concept
mapping [44]). Both approaches can be used to create the
conceptual map used by our framework, and the choice
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depends on the availability of experts on the different
aspects of the insurgency. A direct approach may be taken
when modellers and experts can meet several times to
iteratively construct maps, while an indirect approach
may be necessary when experts on the field communicate
by sending intelligence reports. This section illustrates
both approaches for a typical example of a “revolution-
ary war” [1] or of a terrorist campaign [45], in which
insurgents are engaged in a population-centric war by
shattering the confidence of the local communities in their
government.
Indirect approach
Two steps were used for this approach, which was pre-
viously reported in [17]. First, a scholar in insurgency
assessed which factors and interactions were deemed
most important in a body of literature relevant to the
example of revolutionary war. Then, each interaction was
weighted by using a nuanced reading to extract the over-
all opinion of each peer-reviewed articles speaking to
that interaction, and then combining the opinions using
Fuzzy Logic. This process was resulted in Figure 4. In this
section, we first report on the three groups of factors and
relationships that compose the map. Then, we detail the
technical choices that allowed Fuzzy Logic to be applied
on each edge.
The rebelliousness of a community indicates the level
of its participation in insurgent activities. It is thus the
most closely monitored factor for this scenario. It is deter-
mined by two factors:motive and opportunity. Themotive
is determined by the socio-economic advantage to insur-
gency, which collectively incorporates the social, political,
and economic reasons for which an individual or com-
munity would want to rebel. Opportunities consist of
the mechanisms and material conditions that make rebel-
lious acts possible on an incidental basis. This model
also accounts for the self-reinforcing effect of rebellion, in
which existing rebelliousness facilitates further rebellious-
ness though mechanisms such as insurgent recruitment
networks and the solidification of ascribed political loyal-
ties [3].
The socio-economic advantage to insurgency de-
pends on several factors. The ability of insurgents to con-
trol the population and to use discriminating violence
determines the extent to which they can offer entice-
ments and coercion to the local community, as does the
power of the government to employ discriminate violence.
Indeed, “control - regardless of the ‘true’ preferences of
the population - precludes options other than collabora-
tion by creating credible benefits for collaborators and,
more importantly, sanctions for defectors” [3]. Commu-
nity economic factors also play a powerful role. The rate
or level of economic development determines the oppor-
tunity costs of participation, where economic recession
makes participation in rebellion less risky or costly in
comparison to times of economic boom [46]. Natural
resources vulnerable to looting or military capture present
a tantalising incentive to join armed groups [47]. For
example, in the developing world, “conflict diamonds” or
the drug trade influenced the development and prolifera-
tion of militias [48] described as a class of ‘feral’ insurgent
[49], since their activism is a means of survival instead
of an institutional mechanism to secure popular support.
High unemployment among young men produces a likely
Figure 4Map from the indirect approach. Each edge is either positive (full line) or negative (dashed line). Edges’ weights have been discretized
as “very high” (0.9 and above), “high” (0.76 and above), “medium” (0.7 and above), “low” (0.5 and above), or “very low” (less than 0.5).
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pool for insurgent recruitment, as it provides them with
opportunities to advance economically and socially [7].
On a more micro level, a household so poor that its mem-
bers have little means to sustain themselves is particularly
likely to join whichever group happens to offer the best
immediate chance of survival [50]. For example, while
Pakistani rebels often had better education than their
Afghani counterparts, both came from large, impover-
ished households [51].
The opportunity to rebel is strongly linked to the
strength of the insurgent organisation, which affects
whether recruitment mechanisms, arms [52], informa-
tion [3], and logistical capacity make it possible to rebel
in an organised or meaningful way. The strength of an
insurgent organisation increases in the presence of weak
government institutions, limited in their ability to identify
and neutralise insurgent agents [2,3,49,53]. Demographic
precursors for insurgency establish conditions of instabil-
ity that can be exploited by insurgent groups to provide
political justifications and normative space for rebellion.
An existing territorial dispute can evolve into an endur-
ing ethnic or sectarian rivalry, providing the fault-lines
for civil conflict and increased fractionalisation [54]. The
presence of foreign military forces staging an intervention
can inhibit the power of any party to achieve significant
political progress through force of arms, paradoxically
often making conflict longer-lasting and more intractable
[55]. A recent previous civil war can ensure that the pop-
ulation has both lurking hostilities and access to weapons.
The Balkan wars are one example of the facilitating effect
that weapons-saturation has upon making participation
in civil wars feasible [56]. A supportive foreign diaspora
can make funding insurgent activities easier, while the
social exclusion of certain groups makes conflict increas-
ingly easier to justify and prosecute as the excluded group
grows in size.
We capture the precise strength of the 44 discrete rela-
tionships between factors by giving each edge a weight
(Figure 4). To determine the weight of a given edge,
evidence was gathered from nuanced readings of peer-
reviewed articles. Following a standard procedure (e.g.,
see word bank in [30]), the parts of selected articles that
spoke to the relationship under study were examined by a
field expert and categorized using a fuzzy linguistic term
from the set {Very Weak (VW), Weak (W), Medium (M),
Strong (S), Very Strong (VS)}. For example, the selected
parts quoted in the Section on the Fuzzy Cognitive Map
were used to estimate the relationship from Resource Vul-
nerability to Military Capture to Geographic Enabler for
Insurgency; Fearon and Laitin were categorized as strong
as they saw the effect of commodity exports as “con-
siderable” [7], while Ross was categorized under weak
since he sees the link as “fragile” [26]. The different cat-
egories assigned to the evidence constitute a knowledge
base which is combined using Fuzzy Logic Theory. The
membership functions used in this process (Figure 1) are
described by the following standard equations [57]:
µVW (x) = max(min(0, 0.25− x0.25 ), 0) (2)
µW (x) = max(min( x0.25 ,
0.5− x
0.5 − 0.25 ), 0) (3)
µM(x) = max(min( x − 0.250.5 − 0.25 ,
0.75− x
0.75 − 0.5 ), 0) (4)
µS(x) = max(min( x − 0.50.75 − 0.5 ,
1 − x
1 − 0.75 ), 0) (5)
µVS(x) = max(min(x − 0.751 − 0.75 , 1), 0) (6)
The process was carried out for each edge, using the
Mamdani algorithm, the sum method of aggregation, and
the centroid method for defuzzification. These technical
choices are common practice, and we refer the interested
reader to [37] for the technical aspects.
Direct approach
In a direct approach, a purposeful sample of experts is
assembled and guided through a three step process. First,
experts are given a question that will prompt them to
iteratively identify concepts (e.g., writing them on sticky
notes), arrange them (e.g., creating clusters or hierarchies
by moving the notes), link them and re-arrange them to
facilitate the display of links [43]. This step results in
the map’s structure. While that step can be carried on
straightforwardly for simple problems when experts are
all available in one place, it can be challenging for com-
plex problems where a panel of international experts is
needed in order to account for each part of the problem
[31]. Thus, the map’s structure may be set based on a sub-
committee of experts. The second step is to ask all experts
about the strength of each relationship, and the final step
combines their knowledge using Fuzzy Logic Theory as in
the previous section.
To illustrate these steps, we asked international experts
about the contributors to rebelliousness. Due to the com-
plexity of the problem and the wide range of expertise
required to achieve a comprehensive understanding of
insurgency, we structured the map as a set of 24 con-
cepts and 44 relationships based on the feedback obtained
about Figure 4. Experts were then asked to evaluate the
strength of each relationship, by categorizing it as ‘non-
existent’, ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, or ‘very high’;
experts were also given the possibility of choosing ‘unsure’
in order to skip evaluating relationships about which they
did not feel confident. Finally, expert opinions were com-
bined using Fuzzy Logic Theory for each relationship
using the standard procedure aforementioned (i.e., mem-
bership functions specified by equations 1 to 5, Mamdani
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algorithm, sum method of aggregation, and centroid for
defuzzification). The result is shown in Figure 5.
Software solution
Three steps process
Software was built to support the development of models
of insurgency via our framework. While our framework is
first and foremost mathematical, it can be mostly used via
a graphical user interface that aims at making the mod-
elling process as intuitive as possible so that modellers can
focus on the few equations that require a fine tuning. The
modelling process is divided into three steps (Figure 6),
and each step has a dedicated software component that
supports both design and analysis.
A Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) can be created via either
the direct or indirect approaches outlined in the previ-
ous section. Then, it is provided to our software using the
Concept Map editor (Figure 7) which guides modellers in
creating their FCM via a series of steps. In our experience,
some structures typically arise when experts are asked
to think about what contributes to an insurgency. One
such structure is the star, where all factors point to one;
this arises when experts list all the contributors to insur-
gency but do not yet zoom out to consider second-order
contributors as well as interactions. Another structure
is the cycle, which typically represents how insurgen-
cies either grow or are sustained despite interventions.
Therefore, such a structure can directly be built as the
first step (Figure 7-1); alternatively, modellers can cre-
ate or alter structures by directly interacting with the
workspace (Figure 7-2). Then, the map is operationalized
(Figure 7-3) by weighting the links, designating the fac-
tors that must stabilize for the FCM to stop evolving,
designating the factors that can influence or be influ-
enced by others (for integration with the second software
component), and providing initial values. Since an FCM
is assigned to one geographical area, initial values can
either depend on the area, be randomly generated based
on either probability distributions (e.g., normal, inverse
gaussian) or conditional distributions (e.g., the value of a
concept may depend on the value of another concept), or
be populated from real-world data. As data is entered on
the map, modellers can use different layouts to automat-
ically rearrange the display (Figure 7-4). Once the map is
ready, its structure can be analyzed (Figure 7-5) to find
out influential factors, which was can lead to insight in
how themodel was conceived [30]. Finally, the map can be
simulated (Figure 7-6) to show what would happen inde-
pendently of spatial factors or which trajectories could be
obtained based on different initial values.
Figure 5Map from the direct approach. Each edge is either positive (full line) or negative (dashed line). Edges’ weights are proportional to their
value on a scale from 0 to 1.
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Figure 6Modelling process.Models can be developed by following a three steps process.
Once the Fuzzy Cognitive Map has been finalized, the
Coupling Editor is used to provide the mathematical
equations governing influences between FCMs. This is
achieved by first connecting influencing factors (in white
on Figure 8a) to influenced factors (in black on Figure 8a),
and assigning a function to each connection. Such func-
tions can be designed from scratch in Java, or they can
be selected from a set of templates which then only need
to be parameterized. For example, modellers can consider
that a slight difference in the level of economic devel-
opments in neighbouring locations is not important, but
when that difference goes over a given threshold then it
will impact local economic development. To input this
into the model, modellers would select the ‘threshold
and impact’ template (Figure 8a) and provide the values
of both threshold and impact. Similarly, modellers may
notice that a relationships is stronger at the beginning of
the conflict (e.g., demographic precursors) so they would
use the ‘decaying impact’ template and specify both the
impact and rate of decay. Offering access to functions
commonly used in modelling complex social problems
(e.g., threshold and impact [58], fractional and majority
votes [59]) also simplifies the process of modelling devel-
opment, thereby making it accessible to participants with
limited mathematical background.
The final step is to generate the spatial network. During
the early phases of model development, an exact map-
ping might not be available to modellers. Consequently,
Figure 7 Concept Map editor. The Concept Map editor allows the creation, analysis, and simulation of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map.
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Figure 8 Coupling editor and simulation tool. The Coupling Editor allows modellers to apply commonly used functions for the influence of the
surroundings (a). The simulation tool provides a set of network generators that can be analyzed and tuned to match the desired topology (b).
the model might have to operate on assumptions regard-
ing the broad characteristics of the space, and only if
the model proves useful then partnerships can support
the acquisition of accurate data. Our software provides
extensive support for the early phase by allowing mod-
ellers to choose network generators with a desired set of
properties (Figure 8b-1), such as creating planar power-
law networks (Figure 8b) which represent a densely
connected urban centre linked to increasingly isolated
settlements. Since such generators require a fine tun-
ing, analysis tools are provided both for visual inspection
(Figure 8b-2) as well as for the quantification of key met-
rics (e.g., clustering coefficient in Figure 8b-3 or degree
distribution in Figure 8b-4). Once the right network has
been generated, the simulation can be performed and ana-
lyzed to see how factors of the FCM changed over time
(Figure 8b-5).
Sample scenario
The simple model used in this section does not aim
to make accurate recommendations regarding counterin-
surgency strategies. Rather, the experiments focus on
demonstrating the ability of our framework to easily rep-
resent complex dynamics and handle ‘what-if ’ scenar-
ios. We use the model represented in Figure 7, which
articulates how geographical (e.g., inhospitable terrain),
economical (e.g., economic development and unemploy-
ment of young men), and political factors come together
in shaping rebelliousness. The values were obtained by
aggregating expert knowledge using Fuzzy Logic, as in
Figure 5. In this sample scenario, an insurgency has
begun in a resource-based economy. Consequently, the
following assumptions were made on the initial values of
concepts:
• the presence of resources is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation
0.4. That is, regions are resource-rich on average but
significant inequalities are present. Given that the
scenario abstracts a resource-based economy, the
level of economic development is set to match the
presence of resources, whereas the level of
unemployment is inversely proportional to the
presence of resources.
• since recently started, the level of rebelliousness is
still very low (set to 0.1). It is fueled partly by a slight
socio-economic advantage to insurgency (set to 0.1)
and the presence of some opportunities to rebel (set
to 0.2). As the insurgency is only nascent, insurgents
have a limited ability to control the population
(set to 0.2).
• clear ethnic differences are present and occasional
skirmishes are followed by a large discrimination of
counter-insurgent violence (set to 0.7).
• the country has a wide variety of terrains with a
minority deemed inhospitable. Consequently, the
extent to which is terrain is inhospitable is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean 0.3 and
standard deviation 0.5.
Once these hypotheses have been implemented using
the Concept Map Editor, the dynamics of the Fuzzy Cog-
nitive Map can be simulated to see how events would
unfold independently of geographical influences between
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regions (Figure 9). The simulation of this toy model
of insurgency confirms the expectations of experts, as
insurgency gradually arises (Figure 9a) and impairs eco-
nomic development (Figure 9b), thereby providing further
ground for insurgency. Given that the values of some
concepts are drawn from probability distributions, the
outcome of several runs of the simulation can be differ-
ent. To explore the range of possible outcomes, Figures 9
(c-d) provide histograms of the final values. Two equally
probable outcomes appear for insurgency, either by sus-
taining it at an intermediate level or by having a high
level of conflict. Geographical enablers are high in most
cases.
Two factors are involved in influences across regions:
the economic development, and the ability of insurgents
to control the population (black in Figure 7). The Cou-
pling Editor is used to formaly specify these influences
(Figure 8a). A region’s level of economic development
is impacted by the level of economical development of
neighbouring regions, as they are potential trade part-
ners. The relationship is modelled using the ‘threshold
and impact’ template (Figure 8a), such that a (positive or
negative) difference of at least 5% between the level of
economical development of a region and its trading part-
ners will lead to a difference of 5% in that region (c.f.,
[58] for the equations). The control exerted by insurgents
can hinder trades, which is accounted for by decreasing
the level of economical development based on the insur-
gents’ control at a rate of 0.1. Finally, the geography was
abstracted using a planar small-world graph generated
using the method proposed by Zhang et al. [60]; parame-
ter values and properties of the networks are displayed in
Figure 8b.
In the absence of any intervention, the system stabilizes
with high values of insurgency as would be expected from
the aforementioned dynamics. To illustrate the frame-
work’s ability in handling ‘what-if ’ scenarios, three possi-
ble counterinsurgent interventions were modelled: direct
support for economic development (e.g., by restoring
the infrastructure and building local economic capacity),
direct support for security (e.g., by holding areas and
training governmental security forces), and a combina-
tion of the two. In each case, the intervention was mod-
elled by adding a concept in the Fuzzy Cognitive Map
via the Concept Map editor, and linking that concept to
the ones that are directly impacted. Consequently, the
economic intervention increases the level of economic
development (with weight 0.5) whereas the security inter-
ventions decreases the ability of insurgents to control the
population (with weight 0.5), and the combination does
both. The impact of these three possible interventions is
summarized in Table 1 by showing the improvements in
terms of increase in economic development and decrease
in rebelliousness, unemployment, and insurgent control.
Results highlight that, in isolation, economic or security
interventions have little impact on rebelliousness. How-
ever, combining them can achieve a reduction of almost
10%. This is in line with recent military strategies such
Figure 9 Simulation results. Simulations performed via the Concept Map editor show the evolution of economic development (a) and
rebelliousness (b) over time. The final values of rebelliousness (c) and geographical enablers for insurgency (d) are displayed based on 10,000 runs
of the simulation.
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Table 1 Improvements (%) via different interventions
Intervention Rebelliousness Economic development Unemployment Ability of insurgents to
control the population
Economic 2.05 56.57 29.91 None
Security 0.84 99.56 0.76 271.48
Combined 9.87 148.29 181.50 270.74
as the “US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”, which
pointed out the importance of intervening simultane-
ously on political, economical, and security aspects [61].
Our results confirm that a combined strategy is far more
powerful than the sum of its parts.
Discussion
In order to develop accurate models of conflicts that
can support military analysis, computational techniques
need to utilize vasts amounts of data to the best of its
potential. However, uncertainty and conflicts abound in
data collected by observers or synthesized by experts,
making it challenging to effectively incorporate it into
quantitative models. Furthermore, adequately capturing
the spatial and social dynamics of insurgency tends to
require different computational techniques. Our previ-
ous work proposed a novel approach to create models
of insurgency from imperfect data while accounting for
both spatial and social dynamics [17]. While this early
framework addressed some of the needs for modelling
insurgency, it also came with three limitations. First, the
space had to be divided into a set of square cells, which
could lead to either an over-simplification of key spatial
features (e.g., when cells are too large and cover very dis-
tinct neighbourhoods) or a computational burden (e.g.,
when small cells unnecessarily partition a homogeneous
space). Second, the process of model building was centred
on the nuanced reading of scholarly articles, which could
not be straightforwardly applied to gathering first-hand
observations. Finally, the initial development of software
highlighted the need for a more intuitive approach to
model design, such that modellers could focus on key
aspects while the modelling process would be transparent
for stakeholders. This paper extends our previous work
and addresses all three shortcomings aforementioned.
The space is now represented using complex networks,
and generators are also provided to create space when
detailed maps are not available. We detail howmodels can
be built directly from participants’ experience, and pro-
vide a proof-of-concept that synthesizes the expertise of
five scholars in insurgency. Finally, our focus on usabil-
ity during software development has resulted in a set of
tools that can effectively guide modellers and stakeholders
through the process of building a computational model of
insurgency.
Our framework supports the integration of data from
different sources so that analysts can understand conflicts
and run ‘what-if ’ scenarios for counterinsurgency scenar-
ios. It also provides methodological support for scholars
of insurgency in two ways. First, it allows for military
theories, individually or synthetically, to be tested for
consistency by exploring the implications of their suppo-
sitions. Second, it allows for intriguing empirical phenom-
ena to be encountered and explored as the disjuncture
between the actual world and the world contained within
the model. We expect that the use of our framework for
these different endeavours will further drive its evolution,
both through changes in software and refinement of its
mathematical structure.
Our framework currently represents the space using
an unweighted planar graph, such that influences either
totally flow between two adjacent locations or do not. In
practice, adjacency is dynamic: for example, a wall built for
security purposes around the district of Adamiyah would
virtually cut it off from neighbouring districts (Figure 2)
once completed. Adjacency is also a social construct, as
members of one ethnic group may rarely move to places
populated by another ethnic group during a conflict. Our
framework could be augmented to take these aspects
into consideration, by having a dynamic network and
weighting its edges depending on social factors. Further-
more, the assumption of a planar graph can be challenged
due to the spread of violence in non-contiguous areas
via tribal ties. This effect is particularly salient in Iraq,
which has an estimated 150 tribes and 2,000 clans. While
the Ba’athist ideology under Saddam Hussein emphasized
the state over ethnic/sectarian divisions, tribal loyalties
were nonetheless essential to maintain military support
and continue to play a key role in Iraq [62]. Conse-
quently, models often focus on tribal relationships and
road network accessibility to link locations [24]. Captur-
ing such relationships can be achieved in two stages. First,
the requirement for planarity could be waived, as gen-
erating non-planar graphs is straightforward due to the
availability of numerous graph generators [63]. Second,
the requirement for a single edge between two nodes
can also be waived. Frameworks such as wGAP already
use multiple labelled edges between nodes [28], which
would allow to connect places based on multiple cri-
teria such as geographical and ethnic proximity. Such
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additions are virtually endless in a modelling endeavour,
which highlights the need for a trade-off between the
accuracy of the models and the additional complexity
brought into the modelling process. Therefore, applica-
tions of our framework will prove instrumental in gradu-
ally establishing the guidelines for computational methods
of insurgency and continuing to meet them via innovative
frameworks.
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